Sesquicentennial: Proclamation of Universal Military Service Manifesto, January 1, 1874

One-hundred-and-fifty years ago Tsar Alexander II proclaimed a new universal military service requirement into law, which—despite the promises of his predecesors—included Russia’s Mennonites. This act fundamentally changed the course of the Russian Mennonite story, and resulted in the emigration of some 17,000 Mennonites.

The Russian government’s intentions in this regard were first reported in newspapers in November 1870 (note 1) and later confirmed by Senator Evgenii von Hahn, former President of the Guardianship Committee (note 2). Some Russian Mennonite leaders were soon corresponding with American counterparts on the possibility of mass migration (note 3).

Despite painful internal differences in the Mennonite community, between 1871 and Fall 1873 they put up a united front with five joint delegations to St. Petersburg and Yalta to petition for a Mennonite exemption. While the delegations were well received and some options could be discussed with ministers of the Crown, a total exemption from individual service to the state was not an option for debate.

In Fall 1873 Mennonite delegates had hoped to meet with the Tsar himself but were unsuccessful. In their written petition of December 22, 1873, they articulated in no uncertain terms that the still unclear legislation “has unsettled our hearts to the utmost degree” because “we might lose an essential part of our confession of faith. … The matter is so serious and important,” they argued, it will determine “the continuing existence of our community.” The petition was made “in the name Lord Jesus Christ, who through our forefathers handed over to us a gospel of peace” (note 4).

The possibility of mass emigration was especially strong in the Bergthal and Chortitza Colonies, as well as among the Kleine Gemeinde in the Molotschna (note 5).

The axe finally fell on January 1, 1874 with the proclamation of the Universal Service Manifesto:

“[A] significant portion of Russian subjects are freed from the responsibility [of military service] that should be sacred for everyone in an equal measure. … Recent events have proven … that the strength of a state is not in the number of its troops alone, but is primarily in the moral and intellectual qualities of those troops. Those qualities only reach the highest stage of development when the business of defending the fatherland becomes the general affair of the people, when all, without distinction of title or status, unite for that holy cause.” (Note 6)

Paragraph 157 of the new law however granted Mennonites "exemption from service with arms," but obliged them "to serve in [army] workplaces and other institutions" (note 7).

Military reform was the capstone of major socio-political shifts in the late imperial period: military worth was no longer defined by socio-political privilege and title, but by professional military expertise; soldiers too were now to be conscripted individually “as citizens” rather than “en masse on an estate basis.” The reform was designed to fundamentally change—and westernize—the relationship of the individual to the state, with the intention “that military affairs would now become the task of the whole people” (note 8).

Not surprisingly, within three months of the Tsar’s proclamation, Mennonite emigration was in full swing.

As it became clear that Mennonites were not appeased by Paragraph 157, on April 10, 1874 the Tsar, who remembered the “commendable deeds” of the Mennonites during the Crimean campaign, commissioned his personal envoy (and friend of the Mennonites) General Adjutant Eduard Totleben to immediately travel and meet with the Mennonites and prevent a larger emigration (note 9). Upon his arrival in the region Totleben was petitioned by the nobility and merchant class for the same.

“To what extent the retention of the Mennonites in the Territory of New Russia is important can be seen from the fact that, on my arrival in to Ekaterinoslav, a deputation from the nobility and merchants explained to me that the emigration of the Mennonites would be accompanied by the most disastrous consequences for the entire south, because: 1) the Mennonites are advanced people in the economy, and in this respect 2) they are considered the best tenants of the landed estates. With the departure of the Mennonites all the lands in these provinces will fall by half their real value and will partly pass into the hands of the Jews [!], which will have the effect of ruining the landowners and causing a complete decline in regional agriculture. The same was repeatedly confirmed to me by the landowners from the land of the Don Cossaks, who are here in St. Petersburg.” (Note 10)

Over three weeks Totleben’s many explanations and demonstrations of the Tsar’s favour were repeatedly met “with quotes from the gospel and the dogmas of their confession” (note 11). Their “trust in the government had been greatly shaken,” and “having preserved all the provisions of their faith with inviolable severity, they are ready to sacrifice all earthly goods in order to maintain its purity, in view of a kingdom not of this world” (note 12).

Totleben however came prepared with an offer for alternative state service which would only take effect in ten years’ time (note 13). Mennonites would be permitted the option of rendering non-combatant service in factories, fire brigades, hospitals, trains, or work in specially established forestry detachments. Most in the Mennonite community in Russia were openly patriotic and prepared to offer some form of personal civil service, but crucially not under military command. Already during the Crimean War the colonies had made significant voluntary contributions, including care for wounded soldiers in colony hospitals and homes, which in their minds was essentially different from “care rendered under military command” (note 14).

For a majority of Mennonites, forestry service emerged as an acceptable option; detachments would be under a civilian department, and the Mennonite community would be able to offer worship services, pastoral care and discipline to its young men. The detachments would be financed and administered almost entirely by the extended pan-Russian Mennonite commonwealth.

“On account of their exemplary industriousness,” on April 8, 1874 the new Mennonite accommodations or privileges were ratified in an amended Paragraph 157. Mennonites would be permitted to carry out their active service “a) in the work-places of the marine department; b) in the fire brigades; and c) in special mobile detachments of the forestry department" (note 15).

Military exemption, the approval to establish a Mennonite-run forestry service, and the availability of exit visas to those wishing to emigrate were, according to James Urry, “remarkable acts of tolerance on the part of the Russian government” that “reflected how important the state saw the Mennonites” (note 16).

For his efforts Totleben was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir, First Class, with the rights of hereditary nobility, August 1874 (note 17).

While successful, Totleben’s visit was about a year late and his offer entrenched an already split Mennonite opinion. As soon as negotiations were completed, some thirty Mennonite families in Crimea sold their property and belongings to prepare for emigration. The entire Molotschna village of Alexanderwohl prepared to emigrate as well. Retired Rudnerweide Elder Benjamin Ratzlaff had been harboring doubts for at least two years, and found the final offer unacceptable. On May 19, 1874, one month after Totleben’s visit, he preached his farewell sermon and left with his children for America—itself a “witness … for this gospel of truth.” A week later in Pordenau two ministers delivered their farewell sermons. The church’s elder, Isaak Peters, was convinced that the Tsar’s offer of alternative service was “an unevangelical association with the ‘Beast,’ the state, hostile to God.” Of course, the rhetoric went in both directions (note 18), and the reasons for leaving were complex—they were not merely theological, but reflected a growing angst about landlessness (note 19), russification (note 20), control of schools, equality of all citizens, etc. (see links to related posts below). Peters’ rigour and apocalyptic framework divided his congregation, which then forced his resignation. Because of his open advocacy for emigration, Peters was expelled from Russia and left with a small following for Henderson, Nebraska (note 21).

The entire Bergthal Colony—where the problem of landlessness was high and concerns about the state’s offer were real—sold all their properties and chose to emigrate together, as did the Kleine Gemeinde Mennonites (note 22). In total, about one-third of the Mennonite population of New Russia left for North America in the 1870s. January 1, 2024, marks the sesquicentennial of that turning point in the Mennonite story and the crisis that forced the entire Mennonite community to reflect more deeply on their commitment to non-resistance and what that should or could look like moving forward in Russia or North America.

            ---Arnold Neufeldt-Fast

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For related posts, see: https://russianmennonites.blogspot.com/2023/01/1871-mennonite-tough-luck.html; and https://russianmennonites.blogspot.com/2023/01/1873-first-russian-mennonites-leave-for.html; and https://russianmennonites.blogspot.com/2022/09/turning-weapons-into-waffle-irons.html; and https://russianmennonites.blogspot.com/2023/01/leave-for-kansas-if-pankratzes-go-well.html. 

Note 1: Cf. Paul Toews, “Mennonites and the Search for Military Exemption: State Concessions and Conflicts in the 1870s,” in Вопросы германской истории [Voprosii Germanskoi Istorii], 81–105 (Dnepropetrovsk: Porogi, 2007), 10. 

Note 2: Cf. also Josh Sanborn, “Military Reform, Moral Reform and the End of the Old Regime,” in The Military and Society in Russia: 1450–1917, edited by Eric Lohr and Marshall Poe (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 507f.

Note 3: Cf. letters in Cornelius Janzen, Sammlung von Notizen über Amerika (Danzig: Thieme, 1872). (Link). 

Note 4: Franz Isaac, Die Molotschnaer Mennoniten. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte derselben (Halbstadt, Taurien: H. J. Braun, 1908), 319. (Link)

Note 5: Cf. letter to the Tsar from the Chortitza ministerial, April 26, 1874, in Isaac, Molotschnaer Mennoniten, 326.

Note 6: Cited in Sanborn, “Military Reform,” 507.

Note 7: On §157 and its later amendment, cf. George K. Epp, Geschichte der Mennoniten in Rußland, vol. 2 (Lage: Logos, 1998), 226 (NB: Epp erroneously dates the par. 157 amendment as 1874 rather than 1875). On the issues around the policy change and migration, Epp’s entire ch. 7 is excellent, as well as Harry Loewen's “A House Divided. Russian Mennonite Nonresistance and Emigration in the 1870s,” in Mennonites in Russia, 1788–1988, edited by John J. Friesen (Winnipeg, MB: CMBC, 1989), 132f. (link).

Note 8: Sanborn, “Military Reform,” 508. For a more detailed review of the Great Reforms and their impact on Mennonites in Russia, see Epp, Geschichte der Mennoniten, II, 211-225.

Note 9: Letter sent by Theodor Hans, pastor of the Moravian Brethren congregation in St. Petersburg, April 10, 1874, in Isaac, Molotschnaer Mennoniten, 320. For a state perspective, see S. D. Bondar, Mennonite Sect in Russia [1916], translated by Jacob Rempel and edited by Peter Rempel and Glenn Penner (Winnipeg, MB: Mennonite Heritage Archives, 2021), 80f.; 76-82 (link). Russian original: 1916, link.

Note 10: In Nikolai K. Schilder, Graf Eduard Ivanovich Totleben: Ego zhizn’ i’ deyatelnost’ [Count Eduard Ivanovich Totleben: Life and Works] vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Tikhanov, 1885/1886), Appendix, 217 (link). 

Note 11: Cf. Schilder, Graf Eduard Ivanovich Totleben, vol. 2, 709 (link).

Note 12: Cf. Schilder, Graf Eduard Ivanovich Totleben, vol. 1, Appendix, 216.

Note 13: Cf. Gerhard Wiebe, Ursachen und Geschichte der Auswanderung der Mennoniten aus Russland nach Amerika (Winnipeg, MB, 1900), 31 (link).

Note 14: Peter M. Friesen, The Mennonite Brotherhood in Russia, 1789–1910 (Winnipeg, MB: Christian, 1978), 586, 589 (link).

Note 15: In P. Friesen, Mennonite Brotherhood in Russia, 596. See also the entire “Russian Mennonite Immigration Centennial Issue” of the Mennonite Quarterly Review (vol. 48, October 1974); also Hallesches Tageblatt 75, no. 281 (December 2, 1874), 1614. This press report speaks of a second round of offers from the state, in contradiction to documents in Isaac, Molotschnaer Mennoniten, 323–327.

Note 16: James Urry, “The Russian State, the Mennonite World and the Migration from Russia to North America in the 1870s,” Mennonite Life 46, no. 1 (March 1991), 14 (link).

Note 17: Cf. Schilder, Graf Eduard Ivanovich Totleben, vol. 2, 710.

Note 18: Cf. eg., P. Friesen, Mennonite Brotherhood in Russia, 592-594.

Note 19: Cf. esp. G. Epp, Geschichte der Mennoniten in Rußland, II, 235-237.

Note 20: Bondar, Mennonite Sect in Russia, 79f.

Note 21: Isaac Peters, “Die Auswanderung der Mennoniten aus Südrußland,” Zur Heimath 1, no. 4 (1875), 1 (link).

Note 22: See Wiebe, Ursachen und Geschichte der Auswanderung.

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To cite this page: Arnold Neufeldt-Fast, "Sesquicentennial: Universal Military Service Manifesto Proclaimed, January 1, 1874," History of the Russian Mennonites (blog), January 1, 2024.