Waldemar Janzen, my former German professor and advisee, turned eleven years old in 1943. He and his mother and 3,900 others from Chortitza and Rosenthal (Ukraine) were evacuated west to the ethnic German resettler camps in Gau Danzig-West Prussia in October that year (see Part I; note 1). Years later Janzen could still recall much from this childhood experience—including the impact of the visit by Professor Benjamin H. Unruh a few weeks after their arrival. “He was a man who had extended much help to his fellow Mennonites ever since they began to emigrate from Russia during the 1920s” (note 2). Unruh was a father-figure to his people, and his arrival at their camp in West Prussia signaled to the evacuees that they were in good hands (note 3). Unruh’s impact on 7,000 other Chortitza District villagers in Upper Silesia would be the same some weeks later (note 4).
Surprisingly Unruh’s West Prussian camps visit left an equally indelible impression on the Gau’s Operations Commander for Resettler Camps, SS-Hauptsturmführer Bösche and on his deputy SS-Untersturmführer Günther Fast.
In Bösche’s annual report on the camps some three months
later (note 5), he underscored Unruh’s visit to “Chortitza-Germans in all the
main camps” as a stirring and significant highlight. Events in Bösche’s camps
in 1943 included:
- 11 concerts with a total number of participants of 2,300;
- 10 poetry evenings, 2,180 participants;
- 28 political lectures, 5,160 participants (by Reich Propaganda Office and camp leaders);
- 28 ceremonial events, 12,400 participants (Führer’s birthday; Fallen Heroes Day etc.);
- 52 film screenings, 12,200 participants (“the ‘Newsreels’ gave the resettlers particular pleasure, because they often included segments that came from their immediate homeland”).
But none of the activities left the same impression as Unruh’s talks; the report mentions him three times by name.
Unruh sent a summary of his message to a senior officer of
the Ethnic German Liaison Office (VoMi), SS-Obergruppenführer Dr. Gerhard
Wolfrum (note 6)—tasked to assist Unruh “in all matters” (note 7)—who in turn
reported to SS-Oberführer Horst Hoffmeyer (Sonderkommando R), who reported
directly to Reichsführer-SS Himmler. Unruh was never reticent to remind SS
leaders of his mandate: “It is a serious concern of mine, in the spirit of the
discussions at the headquarters of the Reichsführer-SS (Himmler) and with the
head of the Ethnic German Liaison Office, SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz, to help
expand the care of the ethnic Germans in and from the eastern region to the
best of my ability and knowledge” (note 8).
Unruh’s address in each camp was introduced and framed by
Bösche or Fast—an official regime blessing not lost on the resettlers. The
latter were still traumatized and vulnerable and, as Unruh reported to Dr.
Wolfrum, his goal was “to strengthen their trust in God, in the Führer, and in
the Reichsführer-SS [Himmler]”—a surprisingly unorthodox trinity for a Mennonite
salvation message.
Unruh sought to provide a path and give hope not only to his
pious co-religionists, but also to the youth, convincing them to place their
confidence and trust “in our Führer who has intervened to save you”—adding that
it is nothing less than “the omnipotence and all-goodness of Providence itself
which steers and strengthens his [Hitler’s] arm.” Providence is a term which
Unruh’s Mennonites could connect to God’s care, provision, and guidance on
their life journey. But it was also one of the “magic words in Nazi persuasion”
(note 9) which Unruh deployed to the satisfaction of SS-leadership in the room.
Like a Church father who offers a fresh expression of an ancient faith for
believers and would-be believers alike, Unruh’s message resonated both with
resettlers and SS-men who knew Hitler’s propensity to speak of providence in
relation to himself.
Unruh lectured extemporaneously on the contrast between “life under Bolshevik terror and life under National Socialist leadership” (note 10). Resettlers should hold fast to the hope of Nazi Germany’s final victory; here their future would take root. But because the final battle was not yet won, Unruh sought to “reawaken” “their will for discipline and unity,” he reported to Dr. Wolfrum.
“As a fellow countryman,” Unruh made “the most serious appeal”
to the resettlers to be grateful and “to recognize what the Motherland—and that
in the fifth year of the war—was doing for them.” Unruh reminded his listeners
(largely women) that women in Germany had “sacrificed their sons, husbands and
fiancées in order to bring about a better, more just order in Europe and in the
world.” The Führer’s goals for Germany, Europe and the world were the good and right ingredients for global justice, peace and stability. And now Mennonites so
wondrously transplanted to the Motherland “could also be expected,” Unruh
suggested, “to join in the fight against this raging hell with pure and
passionate intercession for our [war] heroes, for our Führer and for our entire
[German] Volk.” In this way they would best help “to protect and support” their
family members “left behind in Soviet exile. And if someone falls on the [war]
front or in Siberia, he falls into Eternal arms!” (note 11). According to Unruh costly sacrifices
were still required (Unruh’s son Fritz too had already died in battle) and any
heroic loss of life was assuredly covered by the Divine’s immutable love and
everlasting embrace. Afterwards Unruh boasted to
Wolfrum that in his assessment his camp tour “was not without significance.”
Unruh won over the SS leaders of the Danzig-West Prussian
camps. The denominational chair Pastor Emil Händiges wrote to Unruh a month
later: “SS-Hauptsturmführer Bösche and [SS-Untersturmführer] Fast spoke of you,
dear Unruh, with great appreciation and enthusiasm, and also showed us the greatest
confidence” (note 12).
Unruh’s visit was a win for Bösche and the SS. Bösche could
report remarkable success in attracting Mennonite volunteers for the Waffen-SS
in the months following the visit:
“It can be said here, however, that especially the resettlers
from the last Operation Chortitza, above all those born in 1915 [age 28] and
younger, already in December almost without exception wanted to voluntarily
present themselves to the supplementary unit of the Waffen-SS for an acceptance
examination. This shows the success of the ideological training on the part of
the camp leaders, who have to carry this out on an ongoing basis by order of
the operational command.” (Note 13)
Bösche gives us a snapshot of the incentives offered to
Operation Chortitza women and children who had a family member in the Wehrmacht
or Waffen-SS. They were given preferential treatment by camp commanders,
offered assistance in filing applications and requests, in the procurement of
clothing and footwear, and also were also “taken into protection if they
feel that they have been wronged by any lack of understanding on the part of
the other resettlers” (note 14).
Bösche was eager to ensure that his camps were the best in
the Reich—“impeccable” and with a positive atmosphere—especially for his
favourites, the Low Germans of Frisian origin, otherwise known as Mennonites.
Bösche promised his superiors that “resettlers will continue to be cared for in
every possible way to make their stay in the camp easier and pleasant” (note 15).
Unruh’s visit was also significant for the West Prussian Mennonite ministerial who not only received authorized passage to all the camps, but a certificate from Bösche requiring individual camp leaders “to assist” them in their pastoral work in the camps “in any way possible.” Heubuden Mennonite Church elder Bruno Ewert (a Nazi Party member) and SS-Untersturmführer Fast also agreed on the regulation of worship services (off-site) and a more equal distribution of lay preachers in each camp (note 16). Ewert baptized 47 at the Konradstein and Kulm Camps (note 17), and Danzig Pastor Erich Göttner baptized 10 at the Neustadt Camp.
In his report to Wolfrum, Unruh skillfully articulated how
Mennonite worship opportunities in the camp linked well with the priorities of
Nazi Germany.
“The regulation of the religious services and the religious
instruction of the youth are of utmost importance [to the resettlers]. In our
Russian-German experiences over all the years and decades of Bolshevik rule,
persecution of religion was the sign (Signum) of demonic Bolshevism. They will
perceive the restoration of religious life as the most specific sign of
rescue/salvation. It may be pointed out that the Russian-German experience
uniquely favours their optimum association with National Socialist Germany.” (Note
18)
Few had the resources, background and skill to think and
argue differently. It is likely that most followed compliantly where Unruh led,
and some—like former Chortitza District Mayor and friend to Unruh, Johann
Epp—were wholly aligned ideologically and fervent co-workers (note 19).
That world crashed a year-and-a-half later, with all its
horrors revealed. More Mennonite sons, brothers and fathers were lost in
service to the Führer than under Stalin—at least that was the case in our
family. Unruh conflated the ways of God and the criminal ambitions of the Führer
and Reichsführer. He leveraged his power, influence and storied Mennonite
reputation to recommend to the vulnerable full adoption of the Nazi worldview
and its ambitions. Unruh was excited to establish a renewed, unified and
racially pure Mennonite church in Germany’s east.
Somehow the very real and lingering impact Unruh had on the
resettlers—like many in my childhood church community—had lost the troublesome
content above. I wonder how that was internalized and how long that toxic
worldview was silently assumed, its loss mourned and/or reshaped in our
immigrant, bilingual congregations. How did it impact our discussions of
worship practice and language, a recovery of Anabaptism and peace theology, of
leadership and ethnicity? How did it impact relationships with the 1920s Canadian
Russländer sitting in the same pews? What still needs work and repair in the
next generation?
---Arnold Neufeldt-Fast
---Notes---
Note 1: See Part I – a preface to this post: https://russianmennonites.blogspot.com/2023/10/operation-chortitza-resettler-camps-in.html.
Note 2: Waldemar Janzen, Growing Up in Turbulent Times
(Winnipeg, MB: CMU Press, 2007), 63f., https://www.cmu.ca/docs/cmupress/CMU-GROWING-UP-IN-TURBULENT-TIMES.pdf.
Note 3: On Unruh, see my essay: “Benjamin Unruh, MCC
[Mennonite Central Committee] and National Socialism,” Mennonite Quarterly
Review 96, no. 2 (April 2022), 157–205, https://digitalcollections.tyndale.ca/handle/20.500.12730/1571.
Note 4: See previous post, https://russianmennonites.blogspot.com/2023/10/a-small-town-near-auschwitz-chortitza.html.
Note 5: Operations Commander SS-Hauptsturmführer Bösche, “Tätigkeitsbericht der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle in Gau Danzig-Westpreussen für 1. Jan. [1943] bis 31. Jan. 1944,” Bundesarchiv R 59/109, Blätter 31-37, https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio/direktlink/54c4be9f-0130-4868-baec-e7a6b5c6628a/.
Note 6: Benjamin H. Unruh to SS-Obersturmführer Dr. Wolfrum
and SS-Obersturmführer Klingsporn, Volkdeutsche Mittelstelle, November 6, 1943,
Vereinigung Executive File 1943, Mennonitische Forschungsstelle Weierhof
[hereafter MFSt]. Thanks to Ben Goossen for sharing copies of the file.
Note 7: Benjamin H. Unruh to Gustav Reimer, letter, December
30, 1943, Vereinigung Collection, folder 1943, MFSt. On Wolfrum and Hoffmeyer, see
Eric C. Steinhart, The Holocaust and the Germanization of Ukraine (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2015).
Note 8: Benjamin Unruh together with Hoffmeyer and SS-Obergruppenführer
Werner Lorenz were special guests of Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler over the
New Years holiday, 1942-43; cf. Unruh’s letter to Vereinigung (denominational)
Executive, Jan. 6, 1943, 2, file folder 1943, Vereinigung Collection, MFSt.
Note 9: Cf. Haig A. Bosmajian, “The Magic Word in Nazi
Persuasion,” ETC: A Review of General Semantics 23, no. 1 (March 1966), 9-23.
Note 10: Unruh to Wolfrum and Klingsporn, November 6, 1943.
Note 11: Unruh to Wolfrum and Klingsporn, November 6, 1943.
Note 12: Händiges to Executive, Dec. 1, 1943. Händiges visited the camps and camp leadership accompanied
by Danzig Mennonite pastor Erich Göttner.
Note 13: Bösche, Tätigkeitsbericht. The enthusiasm to
volunteer may have been more complicated than Bösche reported; compare John
Braun’s experience in Camp Neustadt (Danzig) in Road to Freedom: Mennonites
Escape the Land of Suffering, edited by Harry Loewen (Kitchener, ON: Pandora,
2000), 141.
Note 14: Bösche, Tätigkeitsbericht.
Note 15: Bösche, Tätigkeitsbericht, Blatt 37; similarly
Blätter 31 and 36.
Note 16: Bruno Ewert to Benjamin Unruh, letter, November 8,
1943, folder 1943, Vereinigung Collection, MFSt.
Note 17: Pastor Erich Göttner (Danzig), Mitteilungen der ost- and westpreußischen Mennoniten 4 (Aug. 1944), 8-10, https://mla.bethelks.edu/archives/V_18/box%207%20Winnipeg/68/. Cf. Anna Pauls’ memory of the Pentecost 1944 baptismal service at Konradstein, in Loewen, Road to Freedom, 211f.
Note 18: Unruh to Wolfrum and Klingsporn, November 6, 1943.
Note 19: Johann Epp, now with 7,000 others from the district
in Upper Silesia, updated Unruh in October 1943. Unruh quotes him at length in
his report to the Vereinigung Executive, January 7, 1944 (“Vollbericht über die
Lagerbesuche,” 3); from Benjamin Unruh Collection, folder “Correspondence with
Abraham Braun, 1930, 1940, 1944–45,” MFSt.
---
To cite this page: Arnold Neufeldt-Fast, "'Operation Chortitza' (Part II) -- Resettler Camps in Danzig-West Prussia, 1943-44," History of the Russian Mennonites (blog), October 18, 2023, https://russianmennonites.blogspot.com/2023/10/operation-chortitza-part-ii-resettler.html.
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